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COMMENTS
THE INDIANAPOLIS MAYORALTY CASES
The Supreme Court of Indiana has decided two cases growing
out of the recent dispute concerning the off-ce of mayor in the
City of Indianapolis. These cases are State ex rel. Holmes v.
Slack, 162 N. E. 665, and State ex rel. Hogue v. Slack, 162 N. E.
670. In each case, the relator, claiming-that he was the rightful
nlayor of Indianapolis as against Slack, the defendant, who was
then and still is holding that office, brought an information in
the nature of quo warranto,' in an attempt to oust Slack.
Both cases arose out of substantially the same facts. These
are, briefly, as follows: John L. Duvall was nominated for
mayor of Indianapolis on the Republican ticket in 1925, and was
elected to that office at the election in November of that year.
He duly qualified for, and entered upon office on January 4, 1926,
at the expiration of the term of the former mayor, Samuel L.
Shank, who voluntarily relinquished the office. Duvall, as mayor,
appointed William C. Buser to act as controller in succession to
Joseph L. Hogue, who was the appointee of Shank, and who also
voluntarily relinquished his office at the same time. It may be
noted that Hogue is the relator in the second of the above cases.
In August, 1927, Duvall appointed Claude Johnson as city
comptroller to succeed Buser, and Buser surrendered the office
to Johnson, who had qualified.
In the meantime Duvall had been indicted for a violation of
the Corrupt Practices Act 2 and was convicted on September 22,
1927. This, of course, made Duvall ineligible for the office but
he continued to hold it until October 27th, when he resigned. In
the meantime he had appointed as city comptroller "one Maude
E. Duvall" who, the court might well have taken judicial notice,
is his wife. Upon the resignation of Duvall as mayor, Mrs. Duvall took possession of the office and performed its duties, but
apparently her only official act was to appoint Ira M. Holmes
(the relator in the first case) to the office of comptroller. Holmes
qualified the same day, whereupon Mrs. Duvall resigned as
mayor, and Holmes claimed the office. In the meantime the city
council had adopted a resolution declaring Duvall's inability to
act as mayor since his conviction on September 22, 1927, thus
1 Provided for in Burns' Annotated Statutes, 1926, Sees. 1208-1223, inc.
Note especially Sees. 1208, 1209, 1211 and 1212.
2
Burns' Annotated Statutes, 1926, Sees. 7661-7675, inc.
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invalidating all hip appointments from that time; also declaring
the office of mayor vacant, and electing Claude E. Negley as temporary mayor until the council should hold a special meeting for
the election of a mayor to serve Duvall's unexpired term.3 Negley ousted Holmes from the mayor's office and continued to act as
mayor until November 8th when the defendant, L. Ert Slack,
was elected to serve the unexpired term of Duvall. Slack qualified and has since been acting as mayor.
In the first case, Holmes claimed the right to the office of mayor
of Indianapolis under the provisions of Section 10276 of Burns'
Annotated Statutes of 1926, which provides that in case of a
vacancy in the office of mayor the city comptroller shall act as
mayor, but shall appoint another person to act as city comptroller during this time. It is further provided, however, "In
the event of the death, resignation or disability of the city comptroller, * * * the common council shall designate one of
its members to act as mayor pro tempore until a special meeting
of the council, to be held not less than ten days nor more than
fifteen days thereafter, at which special meeting, the council shall
elect a suitable person to fill out the unexpired term of the
mayor. * * *"
Holmes' contention was, of course, that he had been properly
appointed comptroller by Mrs. Duvall, the then mayor of the
city, and became entitled to the office of mayor upon her resignation. As the court pointed out, this would mean that the
succession of new comptrollers and mayors might continue indefinitely.
It is clear that the only possible remedy for the relator was
to proceed by an information in the nature of quo warranto, this4
being the only remedy when the title to an office is in dispute.
On the other hand, by the express provisions of the statutes and
because of the inherent nature of the proceedings, it is essential
that the relator show that he is himself entitled to the office. 5
It is different, of course, if the proceeding is brought by a prose3 As provided in See. 10276, Burns' Annotated Statutes 1926, hereinafter referred to.
I Carmel, etc. Co. v. Small, 150 Ind. 427, 47 N. E. 11, 50 N. E. 476
(1898). But mandamus proceedings may be used to oust an official holding over when his successor has a certificate of election so that there is no
real dispute as to the office. Couch v. State ez rel. Broun, 169 Ind. 269,
82 N. E. 457 (1907).
5 State exe reL Davis v. Smith, 32 Ind. 213 (1869); Reynolds v. State ex
rel. Titus, 61 Ind. 392 (1878); State ex rel. Ault v. Long, 91 Ind. 351
(1883); State ex rel. Strass v. Tancey, 161 Ind. 491, 69 N. E. 155 (1903);
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cuting attorney merely for the purpose of ousting a person who
holds the office illegally6, but if the action is brought by one
other than the prosecuting attorney he can obtain relief only
upon showing that he is himself entitled to the office. 7 Accordingly the court did not consider whether or not the defendant
Slack was entitled to the office; the only question was whether
the relator Holmes showed good title to it.
It was held that he did not. In the first place, the statutory
provision was not, as the relator seemed to think, that a city
comptroller should become mayor upon a vacancy in the office;
it was only that he should "act as mayor." This is quite a different thing; for example, a mere right to act as an officer does not
give one such title to the office as is essential to maintain this
sort of proceeding.8 Furthermore, the relator's construction of
the statute entirely ignored the provision above quoted. If the
relator was correct, there would never be any opportunity for
the common council to designate a mayor, since the acting mayor
would himself appoint a comptroller who would be next in line
for the office of mayor. It is apparent, therefore, that the statute means that the comptroller shall step into the office of mayor,
in case of a vacancy, only as an acting mayor, and appoint only
an acting comptroller who is not eligible to succeed to the office
of mayor. It resulted that the relator Holmes was not entitled
to the office of mayor, and the proceeding was dismissed.
Hogue, the relator in the second case, was made a co-defendant
with Slack in the first case but no relief was given against him,
since Holmes showed no right. In the second case, however
Hogue's own rights came into question. The facts are, of course,
essentially the same as in the previous case, and Hogue's theory
was that he was at all times the rightful city comptroller and
State ex rel. Keifer v. Wheatley, 160 Ind. 183, 66 N. E. 684 (1903); State
ex rel. Clawson v. Bell, 169 Ind. 61, 82 N. E. 69 (1907). This is specifically

provided by Sec. 1212, Burns Annotated Statutes 1926.
6 Chambers v. State ex rel. Barnard,127 Ind. 365, 26 N. E. 893 (1890);
Relender v. State ex rel. Utz, 149 Ind. 283, 49 N. E. 30 (1898). The distinction is pointed out by Throop on Public Officers, Sec. 781, as lying in
the different purposes of the two proceedings; the action by the prosecuting

attorney being primarily for the purpose of ousting a usurper, while the
action if brought by anyone else is for the purpose of putting the relator
into office. In the latter case it is, of course, essential that he show himself
entitled to the office.

See also Reynolds v. State ex rel. Titus, supra, note 5

for a discussion of the same distinction.
7 See cases cited in note 5, supra.
8

State ex rel. Maxwell v. Dudley, 161 Ind. 431, 68 N. E. 899 (1903).
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was, therefore, entitled to the office of mayor upon Duvall's resignation, (Shank having in the meantime died) under the provisions of Section 10276 of Burns, already quoted. This claim
was denied by the court, though with one judge dissenting. 9
Of course, Hogue was under the same necessity of proving
his own title to the office in order to maintain the suit.'0 This,
however, he attempted to do in the manner already stated-that
is, he claimed that he had never ceased to be the rightful comptroller of the city and was, therefore, entitled to act as mayor.
He thus avoided the difficulty, which Holmes had, of ignoring
any part of the statute. Hogue's claim thus rested solely upon
the hypothesis that he was at all times the rightful city comptroller."
To this hypothesis, however, there are two conclusive objections. Buser, the successor of Hogue as comptroller, had actually
qualified and assumed the office, while Hogue himself had voluntarily withdrawn. It would appear, therefore, that Buser was
12
entitled to the office,. even though his right to it was contested.
The Indiana rule, which follows the weight of authority, is that
there is no vacancy in an office until the person chosen as successor qualifies, even though the term of office of the incumbent
is limited by statutory or constitutional provisions ;13 but if the
successor qualifies, the incumbent has no right to hold over, even
though the successor cannot take office. 14 Since Buser thus
qualified, he was entitled to the office, and could have compelled
Hogue to give it up, even if the latter had not done so voluntar9 The dissenting opinion is reported in 163 N. E. 21.
10 See note 5, supra.
11 But even then Hogue seems to have no claim to the office of mayor;
he can only be an acting mayor. State ex rel. Maxwell v. Dudley, supra,
note 8.
12 Art. 15, Sec. 3 of the state constitution provides in effect that an
officer may hold over until his successor is chosen and has qualified. But
if the successor has qualified, the latter is entitled to the office even though
his title to it is disputed. DeArmand v. State ex rel. Campbell, 40 Ind. 469
(1872); Parmaterv. State ex rel. Drake, 102 Ind. 90, 3 N. E. 382 (1885).
Contra, State ex rel. Taylor v. Sullivan, 45 Minn. 309, 47 N. W. 802 (1891).
13 State ev rel. Reese v. Bogard, 128 Ind. 480, 27 N. E. 1113 (1891);
Kimberlin v. State ex Tel. Tow, 130 Ind. 120, 29 N. E. 773 (1891); State
ex rel. Culbert v. Linkhauer, 142 Ind. 94, 41 N. E. 325 (1895). Gosman v.
State ex rel. Schumacker, 106 Ind. 203, 6 N. E. 349 (1885) is hard to
reconcile with this doctrine but is of doubtful authority now. See State
ex rel. Reese v. Bogard, supra.
14 See cases cited in note 12, sup ra; see also State ex Tel. Elliott v.
Bemenderfer, 96 Ind. 374 (1884).
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ily. In fact, Hogue did voluntarily retire and this in itself
would seem to settle the controversy. 15
Furthermore, Buser was a de jure officer. It may be conceded that Duvall was only a de facto officer, in view of his violation of the Corrupt Practices Act. It could hardly be contended, however, that he was a mere usurper of the office, for
he had fully qualified and was acting as mayor without objections from anyone. 16 In fact, no one else was entitled to the
office.'7 If it be admitted that Duvall was mayor de facto, the
only question is whether a de facto officer can appoint a de jure
officer. The distinct weight of authority is that he may.' 8 The
dissenting opinion is primarily an attack upon the soundness of
this principle. It is said that the rule upholding the acts of de
facto officers is solely to protect third persons and that it is unnecessary for this purpose that the appointing power of a de
facto officer be sustained. Logically, it does seem absurd that
a mere de facto officer can appoint a de jure officer, but the
whole doctrine of de facto officers is illogical. The doctrine
that the appointee of a de facto officer is entitled to the rights of
a de jure officer is based solely upon convenience, and as such,
seems justified. Such being the case, Buser was de jure comptroller of Indianapolis, and Hogue's term had expired. This
shows, of course, that he had no claim to the office of mayor.
These decisions should settle the present title to the office of
15 See McGee v. State ex rel. Axtell, 103 Ind. 444, 3 N. E. 134 (1885).
There are, it is true, authorities to the effect that a person who retires from
office in favor of a successor who later proves to have been ineligible, may
regain the office when this ineligibility appears. State ex rel. Thayer V.
Boyd, 31 Neb. 628, 48 N. E. 739 (1891) ; State ex rel. Truitt v. Levy Court,
140 Atl. 642 (Delaware, 1927). But Hogue was certainly guilty of laches,
as the court points out; besides he was seeking the office of mayor, not
comptroller.
16Hamlin v. Kassafer, 15 Ore. 456, 15 Pac. 778 (1887).
There is
authority that a person constitutionally ineligible to an office is not a
de facto officer (Shelby v. Alcorn, 36 Miss. 273 (1858)) ;"but, assuming the
soundness of this doctrine, it cannot apply to a mere statutory ineligibility,
known only to the officer and his confederates, without doing away with
the whole doctrine of d facto officers.
17 Compare Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 61 S. W. 735 (1901).
18 People ex rel. Norflet v. Staton, 73 N. C. 546 (1875) ; State ex rel.

Herron v. Smith, 44 Oh. St. 348, 7 N., E. 447 (1886) ; Attorney-General ex
reL Fuller v. Parsell, 99 Mich. 381, 58 N. W. 335 (1894); Brinkerhoff v.
Jersey City, 64 N. J. L. 225, 46 At]. 170 (1900); Lanes v. Walls, 160 Ind.
216, 66 N. E. 279 (1903). Contra, People ez rel. Steinert U. Anthony,
6 Huh. (N. Y.) 142 (1875). See also Mechem on Public Officers, See. 328.
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mayor in the metropolis of our state. Although they are not
binding with respect to anyone else who may claim the office
as against Slack,19 yet so far as appears, no one now is claiming
the office. Unfortunately, however, Duvall's appeal from his
conviction under the Corrupt Practices Act remains to be decided by the Supreme Court, so that the state is not yet free from
this rather unsavory legal and political episode.
ROBERT C. BROWN.
Indiana University School of Law.
19 Modlin v. State ex rel. Townsend, 175 Ind. 511, 94 N. E. 826 (1911).

